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Abstract. Dependable operation of the Internet is of crucial importance
for our society. In recent years Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks have quickly become a major problem for the Internet. Most of
these attacks are initiated by kids that target schools, ISPs, banks and
web-shops; the Dutch NREN (SURFNet), for example, sees around 10 of
such attacks per day. Performing attacks is extremely simple, since many
websites offer “DDoS as a Service”; in fact it is easier to order a DDoS
attack than to book a hotel! The websites that offer such DDoS attacks
are called “Booters” or Stressers”, and are able to perform attacks with a
strength of many Gbps. Although current attempts to mitigate attacks
seem promising, analysis of recent attacks learns that it is quite easy
to build next generation attack tools that are able to generate DDoS
attacks with a strength thousand to one million times higher than the
ones we see today. If such tools are used by nation-states or, more likely,
terrorists, it should be possible to completely stop the Internet. This
paper argues that we should prepare for such novel attacks.
1 Current DDoS attacks
Current DDoS attacks are often performed by youngsters via websites that offer
“DDoS as a Service”. Such websites, which are called “Booters” or Stressers”,
are able to generate attacks with strengths of many Gbps. A simple Google
search shows that hundreds of such Booters are currently active; the costs to
perform a series of attacks is typically a few dollars [1][2]. In general Booters
do not attack their targets directly, but use one or two levels of intermediate
systems to strengthen and anonymise the attacks. The first level is formed by
botnets that start the attack once they receive specific commands from the
Booter. The second level is used to amplify the attack and can, for example,
involve a set of DNS or NTP servers that react upon the reception of relatively
small requests by sending large response packets. The ratio between response
and request message size is the amplification factor; in practice we find factors
between ten and hundred. Particularly popular for amplification attacks are so-
called open DNS resolvers, which are basically misconfigured DNS servers that
answer DNS queries irrespective of their origin. To target a specific victim, the
attacker does not put its own IP-address in the request, but the address of the
target. Response packets will therefore be routed towards the victim, and the
identity of the attacker remains unknown (IP spoofing).
2 Analysis of current DDoS attacks
To understand how Booters operate, we will discuss a series of attacks which
we performed on our own infrastructure [2]. Nine Booters were used; two of
which generated so-called CharGen attacks whereas the other seven performed
DNS amplification attacks. An interesting observation was that only two of these
Booters shared their attack infrastructure. In other words, if an attacker would
not use a single Booter but instead all available Booters, the strength of the
combined attack would be nearly the sum of all individual attacks.
The strongest CharGen attack we performed had a strength of 7.5 Gbps,
whereas the DNS amplification attacks varied in strength between 0.4 and 1.6
Gbps (Figure 1). Since CharGen attacks can easily be mitigated by filtering
UDP port 19, in the remainder we will focus on DNS attacks, which are much
harder to mitigate. Figure 2 shows the average DNS response message size for
each Booter attack; for three of them the size remains below thousand bytes,
whereas the three top Booters showed average sizes between 3000-4000 bytes.
These differences can be explained from the fact that the various Booters queried
different DNS host names. If the Booters that performed the weakest attacks
would just change these host names, their attacks would become a factor three
to four more powerful. Such changes can be implemented within a few seconds
by just modifying a single line in the attack source code.
Finally we observed that each booter used between 3000 to 8000 DNS re-
solvers for amplifying the DNS attack. It should be clear that the strength of
the attacks can easily be increased by using far more DNS resolvers.
 0
 0.4
 0.8
 1.2
 1.6
 2
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Tr
af
fic
 ra
te
 [G
bp
s]
Time [s]
Fig. 1: DNS traffic rate
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  1500  3000  4500  6000
CD
F
Packet size [bytes]
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
Fig. 2: DNS packet size distribution
We may conclude that DDoS attacks can easily be made stronger if 1) young-
sters combine the forces of different Booters, 2) if Booter operators optimise their
DNS queries and 3) more DNS resolvers are used.
3 How to make DDoS attacks more powerful
The interesting question is how a group of skilled “professionals” would proceed
to generate attacks far beyond anything we’ve seen yet. Such “professionals”
could be nation states or, more likely, a group of terrorists that aim at disrupting
our current society. Instead of relying on standard Booters that operate under
the control of some unknown entity, such “professionals” would likely build their
own attack tools and infrastructure.
As opposed to Booters that use a limited set of 3000 to 8000 open DNS re-
solvers, “professionals” might use the potential of all existing open DNS resolvers
to amplify attacks. According to the Open Resolver Project, around 20 million
of such systems exist [3]. Alternatively, amplification can also be achieved by
using standard authoritative DNS servers; there are hundreds of millions of such
servers that allow amplification with a factors between 6 and 12. Particularly
interesting may be the 3.5 million DNSSEC servers, which include digital signa-
tures in their responses and therefore allow much higher amplification factors;
factors between 40 and 55 should be realistic [4]. In addition to DNS systems,
attackers can also use open NTP (4 million), open SNMP (8 million) or other
servers to amplify attacks [5][6].
An important component is the botnet that coordinates and distributes the
attack; the bigger the botnet, the more powerful the attack. An interesting ques-
tion therefore is “how easy would it be to create a botnet with thousands of sys-
tems”. One answer to this question can be found by examining the Carna Botnet
that was created as part of the “Internet Census 2012” [7]. The creators of that
botnet targeted access routers and other embedded devices running OpenWRT.
They found 1.2 Million unprotected devices, of which 420 thousand were used for
their Carna botnet. It took the developer(s) six months to develop the software
and setup the infrastructure; once deployment started it took only a single day
to infect the first 100 thousand systems.
Instead of hacking OpenWRT routers, “professionals” could also exploit the
emerging Internet of Things (IoT) for their attacks. Recent reports by Garner
and HP predicted that by 2020 there will be 26 billion active IoT devices, of
which 60% will be insecure [8]. Even if only a fraction of them could be misused
for DDoS attacks, it should be easy to generate attacks of hundreds of Tbps.
If such attacks would target crucial systems, it is clear that the entire Internet
would collapse with devastating consequences for our society .
4 Conclusions
In the previous section we argued that it is relatively easy to perform DDoS
attacks with a strength thousand to one million times higher than the ones we see
today. Such attacks can be launched by nation states or, more likely, terrorists.
The question is not if massive DDoS attacks with a strength of hundreds of Tbps
will take place, but when.
We should therefore prepare for such attacks, and create plans on how to
react once such attacks take place. Like traditional terrorist attacks, governments
need to play a crucial role in the coordination of mitigation strategies; it is not
acceptable to leave such role at Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or security
companies. Governments should force ISPs to develop tools and techniques to
automatically quarantaine customers with hacked devices that participate in
massive DDoS attacks. ISPs should join forces and create “Trusted Networks”
to ensure that some limited form of communication remains possible once such
attacks take place.
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